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A WI SE JUSTI CE’ S FOREWARNI NG
In 1949, Justice Frank Murphy dissented in the case of Wolf
v. Colorado, passionately defending the exclusionary rule.
The forward-thinking justice, who was a leading advocate in
the  ght for racial equality, warned that only by exclusion
can we ensure that police will act in accordance with the
constitution. He warned of “[t]oday’s decision will do ines-
timable harm to the cause of fair police methods in our
cities and states.”  In the wake of Breonna Taylor’s death,
Justice Murphy’s prophetic words resonate in the streets as
the chanting of Black Lives Matter protesters echo “NO
JUSTICE! NO PEACE! PROSECUTE THE POLICE!” By repeat-
edly justifying o cer misconduct on the basis of the good
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Breonna Taylor at a graduation cere-
mony in Louisville, Kentucky. Source.
faith exception, the Supreme Court has negated an essen-
tial purpose of the exclusionary rule: preventing the justice
system from acting as an accomplice to unconstitutional
activity. It is time to eliminate this exception.
THE EXCLUSI ONARY RULE AND BREONNA TAYLOR
On March 13, 2020, Ms. Breonna Taylor settled into bed with
her boyfriend Kenneth Walker after she  nished working
back-to-back shifts as an emergency room technician in
Louisville, Kentucky. At around 12:30 am, the couple heard
banging coming from their front door, they asked who was
at the door. They heard no response. Suddenly, the front
door “ ies o  its hinges,” and armed men began to enter
their apartment. Mr. Walker, a licensed gun owner,  red at
the intruders, shooting one in the leg, to protect himself
and Ms. Taylor from unknown intruders. The intruders re-
turned  re, with around thirty rounds, killing Ms. Taylor. Bre-
onna Taylor was innocent and only twenty-six years-old
when she died. The intruders who killed her, well… they were actually police o cers in plain clothing
executing what investigations are revealing to have been an invalid search warrant in the middle of
the night.
The facts of the case are  ercely disputed because the o cers who entered Ms. Taylor’s apartment
that night failed to wear body cameras. No one can truly know what transgressions took place in the
killing of Breonna Taylor. What is known is that the a davit used to secure the search warrant was
based on an LMPD o cer’s false testimony, all  ve of the a davits related to the search that night
were signed in under twelve minutes by a judge who did not print her name under her signature, the
target of the search was apprehended hours before o cers entered Ms. Taylor’s apartment, and sev-
eral other legally required procedures were violated. These incremental mistakes and breaches of
protocol were exactly the types of shortcuts and misconduct that the exclusionary rule was meant to
deter and ensure that law enforcement would resist “ends justify the means,” thinking.  The Fourth
Amendment is meant to protect suspects and innocents alike. So how did we get here? What has
become of the exclusionary rule’s prophylactic power to deter constitutional violations by police?
That power has been eroded by the Good Faith Exception.
THE EXCLUSI ONARY RULE’ S I NCEPTI ON
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people—us—against unreasonable searches,
seizures, and warrantless conduct by government actors—police o cers. The Supreme Court has
added safeguards to this amendment, with the seminal cases of U.S. v. Weeks and Mapp v. Ohio. The
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Court created the exclusionary rule, which excludes evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment from criminal trials. Initially designed as a multifaceted legal mechanism to uphold judi-
cial integrity, deter police misconduct, and serve as a remedy for those who are victims of constitu-
tional violations. The deterrent value was meant to help protect the public at large—especially those
who are innocent of any wrongdoing—from being subject to such illegal searches and the deadly
consequences they may present.
CASE LAW OVERVI EW
Twenty years after the Court laid out the many justi cations for the exclusionary in Mapp v. Ohio it
slowly began eroding the rule’s powerful purpose. Beginning with U.S. v. Leon where the Court stated
that the “rule thus operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent e ect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.’” citing, U.S. v. Calandra. Later, in Herring v. U.S., the Court also reasoned that “the exclusion-
ary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it “result[s] in appreciable deterrence.” Again,
in Davis v. U.S. the Court declared that “The sole purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter delib-
erate or reckless disregard for Fourth Amendment rights.” These are among the many cases that ex-
emplify the ways in which the Court has undermined and limited the scope of the exclusionary and
we bear witness to the consequences of these decisions today.
THE GOOD FAI TH EXCEPTI ON AND I TS CRI PPLI NG EFFECT ON THE EXCLUSI ONARY RULE
The issue of the exclusionary rule only comes up in cases in which police have obtained incriminating
evidence against a person the government seeks to convict. This likely accounts for the Court’s will-
ingness to carve out broad exceptions to ensure against situations where “the criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered,” as then Court of Appeals of the State of New York Judge
Benjamin Cardozo stated in 1926 in People v. Defore. However, the killing of Ms. Taylor reveals the
tremendous consequences these exceptions have for all people – the guilty and the innocent. Even
accepting the deterrence rationale as the basis for the exclusionary rule, the Court has stretched this
exception and justi cation to its absolute limit and e ectively rendered null its original purposes of the
rule. This is evidenced by the investigation into the search warrants that led to the death of Ms. Taylor,
which reveal that law enforcement is not su ciently deterred. Rather, law enforcement, and others in
the criminal justice system, have instead internalized the importance of invoking the mantra “I acted
in good faith,” to ensure that incriminating evidence will not be excluded. However, this mindset about
how to skirt the commands of the Constitution has life and death consequences, as well.
The exception to the exclusionary rule weighs the
social costs of letting a guilty person go free in
light of probative evidence, against the bene t of
deterring systemic, intentional, and  agrant police
misconduct. The language in the good faith ex-
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Photo by Andrew “Donovan” Valdivia on Un-
splash.
ception has been used to employ a myriad of new
exceptions undermining the exclusionary rule. Po-
lice practices involving warrants have been greatly
impacted because o cers can now search and
seize as they please and rely on these good faith
loopholes to act with impunity. The good faith ex-
ception works similarly the excuse used by the
 rst graders when they say, “the dog ate my
homework,” by allowing the student to continu-
ously use that excuse the outcome is that the stu-
dent will never learn the lessons the homework is
meant to teach. By allowing the o cer to use the
good faith exception, just like the  rst grader, he
will also never learn how and why he must con-
duct his police work constitutionally. However, un-
like the  rst grader, when courts fail to hold police
o cers accountable for their wrongdoing the out-
come can be deadly.
In U.S. v. Leon, the Court decided to admit unlaw-
fully obtained evidence on the assumption that
the o cers who relied on a search warrant that
was reviewed by a magistrate couldn’t reasonably
question its validity. The reasoning was that “[o]nce
the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more
the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law, and penalizing the o cer for the
magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence,” of future o cer
misconduct. The Court did not seem concerned with the fact that the o cer used testimony that
lacked probable cause. They blamed the judge who, they reasoned, cannot be deterred from com-
mitting future errors by the exclusionary rule’s threat of suppression.
The rationale used in Leon laid the foundation for Herring v. U.S., which once again favored the o cer
by admitting the evidence he found based on an expired warrant. The Court reiterated that the exclu-
sionary rule cannot be expected to deter clerical errors and outdated databases, ignoring the argu-
ment that they form a cohesive law enforcement team. In Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent, she
stated the importance of the incentives that the exclusionary rule creates highlighting yet another im-
portant purpose the multifaceted rule serves. She stated, “It ‘enabl[es] the judiciary to avoid the taint
of partnership in o cial lawlessness,’ and it ‘assur[es] the people—all potential victims of unlawful
government conduct—that the government would not pro t from its lawless behavior, thus minimiz-
ing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government.’” Her point astutely brings to light
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the consequences of what can happen when law enforcement is repeatedly allowed to act without
consequence. The case of Ms. Breonna Taylor is an example of the worst that can happen.
APPLYI NG THE EXCLUSI ONARY RULE, AS I T STANDS TODAY, TO THE BREONNA TAYLOR CASE
The a davit used to obtain the “No-Knock”
search warrant which resulted in the death of
Breonna Taylor is now being scrutinized. The
detective who applied for the warrant has ad-
mitted to using inaccurate testimony in order to
obtain the search warrants. Of course, this was
the exact type of misconduct that the exclu-
sionary rule is meant to deter. The magistrate
who signed the warrants in this case most likely
would not have noticed the lack of probable
cause because she signed all  ve warrants in
under twelve minutes and failed to even write
out her name below her signature. Does this
not call into question the Court’s reasoning that
they cannot expect the threat of suppression to
deter a neutral judicial o cer from misconduct?
Detective Josh Jaynes, the detective men-
tioned above, was interviewed by the Public In-
tegrity Unit shortly after the death of Breanna
Taylor. In the video from the interview he claims
that the a davit was based on information from
a other o cers and not purely his own direct
knowledge. A key point used to establish proba-
ble cause in Jaynes’ a davit states that he veri-
 ed through a U.S. Postal Inspector that the main suspect was receiving suspicious packages at Ms.
Taylor’s apartment. This has been refuted by the U.S. Postal Inspector, several other o cers including
those who helped to prepare the a davit, and Det. Jaynes himself. When he was questioned about
the discrepancy, he states, “I could have worded a little bit di erently in there.” In the full transcript
from the interview (see pages 383 and 407) he speci cally uses the language “I was acting in good
faith,” to defend his conduct.
No narcotics were found at Ms. Taylor’s home; she was innocent. Had Detective Jaynes, Judge Mary
Shaw, and the entire LMPD been more careful, fearing the exclusionary rule’s sanctions, Ms. Taylor
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would likely still be alive. Although her family is among the few who were able to get  nancial redress
in the form of a settlement, the life taken from an innocent person can never be truly be vindicated.
Breonna’s death is not an outlier. Sixty-seven years after Justice Murphy’s cautionary dissent, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor stresses a similar point in her dissent in Utah v. Strie , which reads like a poetic ode
to the Black Lives Matter movement. She states, “We must not pretend that the countless people
who are routinely targeted by police are ‘isolated.’ They are the canaries in the coal mine whose
deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. They are the ones who
recognize that unlawful police [acts] corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives. Until their
voices matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but.” To bring an end the systemic
reign of police misconduct and killing we must end the use of the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.
Yasamin Elahi-Shirazi is a Juris Doctorate Candidate at Golden Gate University, School of Law in San
Francisco, California. She has a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of California,
Riverside.
To review more documents from the Public Integrity Unit’s investigation about Breonna Taylor’s case
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